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NOTE
ANTITRUST - Municipal Immunity and the Sherman Act:
A New and Ambiguous Standard. Fisher v. City of Berkeley,
106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, "every contract, com-
bination... or conspiracy in restraint of trade... is declared
to be illegal."' In Fisher v. City of Berkeley,2 the United States
Supreme Court held that Berkeley's municipal rent control or-
dinance, which imposed a ceiling on rental prices3 on residen-
tial property in Berkeley, did not conflict with the Sherman
Act4 and therefore was constitutional.5
The United States Supreme Court, in an eight to one deci-
sion,6 ruled that Berkeley's rent control ordinance7 lacked the
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). This section provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade of commerce among several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or en-
gage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
2. 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
3. Id. at 1047. The rent ceilings placed a price maximum on the residential rents
charged by Berkeley's landlords. Id. Agreements to impose price maximums "no less
than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain
their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment." Albrecht v. Herald Co.,
390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211,
213 (1952)). Such restraints are violations of the Sherman Act. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at
154.
4. 106 S. Ct. at 1051.
5. The ordinance, if determined to conflict with the Sherman Act, would have been
preempted by federal antitrust laws, and therefore be invalid pursuant to the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 1047. The constitutional primacy of
federal law over conflicting state law assures that the federal antitrust laws will domi-
nate whenever there is a head-on conflict between them and state law. See Rice v.
Norman Williams Co, 458 U.S. 654, 659-61 (1982).
6. Justice Marshall delivered the majority opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Rehnquist, Stevens, White, Blackmun and O'Connor joined. Justice Powell filed a
concurring opinion and Justice Brennan dissented. 106 S. Ct. at 1046.
7. Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance 5261 - N.S. (June, 1980).
1986] MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY AND THE SHERMAN ACT 143
element of concerted action 8 required for a section 1 violation
of the Sherman Act.9 The Court acknowledged that although
traditional antitrust law has determined price fixing activities
to be per se violations1° of section 1, the unilateral nature of
the Berkeley price fixing scheme rendered the ordinance
outside the realm of antitrust attack.11 irrespective of its eco-
nomic impact. 12
8. 106 S. Ct. at 1051.
9. A concerted action is a required element of a section 1 violation of the Sherman
Act. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946). The tradi-
tional definition of a concerted action is a "unity of purpose or a common design and
understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement." Id. at 810. See also
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1055
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
10. The per se test is one method the courts have used to determine that a chal-
lenged activity unreasonably restricts competition. Per se violations are anti-competi-
tive agreements which by "nature and necessary effect are so plainly anti-competitive
that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality." National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
Although the Supreme Court has limited the application of the per se rule (see, eg.,
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7-25 (1978) (blanket copyright
licenses negotiated by the American Society of Composers, at fees fixed by the Society,
held not to be a per se violation of section 1); Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 693-96
(engineers anti-competitive bid practices must be analyzed by the rule of reason)), price
fixing agreements traditionally have been classified as per se violations of the Sherman
Act. In United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927), 82% of the pottery
industry's manufacturers formed a cartel to fix prices. Id. at 394. Justice Stone, deliver-
ing the Court's opinion which outlined the per se test, stated:
The aim and result of every price fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimina-
tion of one form of competition .... The reasonable price fixed today may
through economic or business changes become the unreasonable price of to-
morrow. Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the ab-
sence of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed.
Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in them-
selves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute in-
quiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable ....
Id. at 397.
The subsequent decision of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940), first used the per se terminology in finding that "[u]nder the Sherman Act a
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing...
or stabilizing the price of a commodity ... is illegal per se." Id. at 223 (emphasis in
original).
11. 106 S. Ct. at 1049-50.
12. The effect of the ordinance was to deprive Berkeley's landlords of the power to
freely raise their rent. Id. at 1051. The economic impact of such control will be to
eliminate economic efficiency and stabilization, skew income distribution and lead to
uncontrolled economic power. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 118-19 (1967)
for a specific discussion of the negative impact resulting from displacement of
competition.
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This Note commences with a brief synopsis of the facts in
Fisher. Next, a short historical outline and discussion of perti-
nent antitrust law and its application to state and municipal
activities will be presented. An analysis of the Supreme
Court's decision will follow, and this Note will conclude with
an assessment of the ruling and its impact on both economic
activities promoted by municipalities and the national eco-
nomic objectives protected by the Sherman Act.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In June, 1980, the Berkeley electorate passed a rent con-
trol ordinance, 13 which imposed a restraint on the rental rates
a landlord could charge for residential units,14 and froze
Berkeley's rental rates at the May 1980 price level.15 The or-
dinance was designed to address Berkeley's housing crisis, 16
preserve the community's health and welfare, and advance the
policies of the city. 7 It affected approximately 23,000 rental
units in Berkeley. 8
Landlords affected by the ordinance filed suit in California
Superior Court,1 9 seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
based on allegations that the ordinance violated their rights
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. 20 The superior court upheld the ordi-
13. 106 S. Ct. at 1047 (1986).
14. Id. The ordinance provided an exemption for government-owned units, coop-
eratives, hospitals, certain small owner-occupied buildings, and all newly-constructed
buildings. Id.
15. Id.
16. Berkeley and other Southern California cities have experienced a sharp decline
since 1972 in new housing units while experiencing dramatic increases in rent, the
number of condominium conversions and tenant evictions. See A. HESKINS, TENANTS
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 41-44 (1983).
17. Section 3 of the ordinance provides in part:
The purposes of this Ordinance are to regulate residential rent increases in the
City of Berkeley and to protect tenants from unwarranted rent increases and
arbitrary, discriminatory or retaliatory evictions, in order to help maintain the
diversity of the Berkeley community and to ensure compliance with legal obliga-
tions relating to the rental of housing.
Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance 5261 - N.S. § 3 (June 1980).
18. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 678, 693 P.2d 261, 288, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 682, 709 (1985).
19. The original complaint was entered in Alameda County Superior Court. Id. at
660, 693 P.2d at 269, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
20. 106 S. Ct. at 1047.
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nance and the landlords appealed. After the California Court
of Appeals reversed the superior court's decision,2' the United
States Supreme Court decided in Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder22 that the economic activities
promulgated by home-rule municipalities were subject to anti-
trust scrutiny.23 Following that decision, the California
Supreme Court, urged by certain amici curiae,24 addressed the
antitrust issues presented by the ordinance and held that
Berkeley's ordinance did not conflict with the Sherman Act.25
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdic-
tion on the antitrust issue 26 and affirmed the decision.27 The
Court rejected the analysis presented by the California
Supreme Court28 and applied traditional antitrust principles29
to resolve the issue of whether a municipal ordinance, which
places an economic restraint on private parties, directly con-
flicts with the Sherman Act.3 °
II. THE SHERMAN ACT: BACKGROUND, ELEMENTS
AND IMMUNITY
A. Background
Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890 in response to
the racing expansion of new industries which engaged in a
21. Id.
22. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
23. A home-rule municipality is entitled, under the state constitution, to exercise
the "full right of self-government in local and municipal matters." Id. at 43. In limiting
municipal immunity from antitrust law, the Supreme Court held that such a grant of
authority is not sufficient to exempt municipalities from antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 54.
24. The decision to review the issue of the effect of Boulder on the landlords' claim
was raised by amici curiae for both parties. 106 S. Ct. at 1047. The antitrust claim
became the dispositive issue on appeal. Id. at 1047-48.
25. Id. at 1048.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1051.
28. The California Supreme Court devised its own analytical standard for the anti-
competitive practices of municipalities after recognizing that traditional economic anal-
ysis failed to give deference to the legitimate municipal interest of promoting public
welfare. 106 S. Ct. at 1048. The standard employed by the California Supreme Court
was based upon United States Supreme Court commerce clause cases. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1047.
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concentration of power and price fixing. The Act outlaws
combinations that unreasonably restrain trade.31
The initial Act was broad and simple.32 According to its
promoter, Senator Sherman, its purpose was to declare "gen-
eral economic principles. ' 33 One such fundamental principle
was to retain the advantages of both combination and compe-
tition in the economy while prohibiting combinations that pre-
vent competition.34
The aim and scope of the Act has changed dramatically
since its early challenge to the flagrantly anti-competitive ac-
tivities of the trusts.3 5 Modem antitrust, so far as practicable,
seeks to arrest private efforts which impair competitive vigor,
fairness and effectiveness.36 In pursuit of this objective, the
Act has been broadly applied to challenge anti-competitive ac-
tivities of corporations, associations and cities throughout the
country.37
B. Elements of a Section One Violation: Concerted Action
and Unreasonable Restraint of Trade
Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws only those combina-
tions which unreasonably restrain trade.38 Regardless of the
economic impact of an activity, section 1 does not prohibit
unilaterally anti-competitive activities. A concerted action,
defined as "a unity of purpose or a common design ... or a
31. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). The Supreme Court,
after reviewing the legislative history behind the Act, concluded in Standard Oil that it
was not the intent of Congress to prohibit all contracts which significantly imposed a
restraint on trade, but rather only those agreements which unreasonably restricted com-
petition. Id.
32. See A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 14-21
(1980) for an excellent outline of the historical development of antitrust laws in the
United States.
33. 21 Cong. Rec. 2,460 (1890).
34. See A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, supra note 32, at 20.
35. Id. at 20. The level of enforcement of the Sherman Act has been subject to the
American business climate, political pressures and judicial interpretation since 1890.
See generally id. at 19-21.
36. Id. at 21.
37. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 395 (1978).
38. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58.
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meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement"3 9 must be pres-
ent for a violation of the Act.
Section 1 does not apply to all concerted actions. Only
those activities which result in unreasonable restraints of trade
are outlawed.' Through decades of enforcement of the Act,
two standards have been used to determine whether the chal-
lenged activity unreasonably restrains trade: the rule of rea-
son and the per se test. Under the rule of reason, an activity
will be violative of the Sherman Act if it has a substantially
adverse effect upon trade,41 while per se violations are limited
to activities which have been held to have anti-competitive ef-
fects regardless of the context in which they are found.42 Hor-
izontal price fixing, including price ceilings, has traditionally
been considered a per se violation of section 1.41
C. Immunity From Antitrust Laws
As previously noted, the objective of the Sherman Act is to
protect free market competition. 44 However, given that an
unregulated market does not always accommodate important
public interests,4 5 certain anti-competitive activities have been
found to be immune from the Sherman Act. The scope and
number of such immunities has been limited, however, to in-
stances where there is an overwhelming public policy reason
39. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946). In addition
to a concerted action and unreasonable restraint of trade, section 1 requires that inter-
state commerce be affected. Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc.,
547 F. Supp. 893, 917 (S.D. Ohio 1981). The interstate commerce requirement is gener-
ally satisfied by a wide variety of circumstances and is broadly construed. See, e.g.,
Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1981).
40. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
for an analysis of the two standards employed by the courts.
41. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967); see also
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 n.15 (1940) (Sherman Act designed to
prevent restraints of trade which have a significant effect on competition). Although the
rule of reason is the standard more commonly utilized to determine if an activity unrea-
sonably restrains trade, the rule of reason was not applied in the Fisher decision.
42. The per se test is the applicable standard for the rent ceiling created by the
Berkeley ordinance. For a discussion of the per se standard, see supra note 10.
43. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
45. Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, in ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRAN-
SITION: THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND ECONOMiCs 45 (1984).
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for displacement of competition.46 Anti-competitive actions of
the states is one area where such immunity has been found.47
1. Parker State-Action Doctrine
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court considered the
applicability of the Sherman Act to regulatory activities of the
states for the first time in its landmark decision of Parker v.
Brown.48 Parker involved a challenge to a California state
program which restricted production levels in California's rai-
sin industry in order to stabilize industry prices.49 The Court
held that the state's anti-competitive program was immune
from antitrust attack. The Court found that market stabiliza-
tion was a matter of state as well as national concern, and that
state efforts to achieve this objective should be permitted in
the "absence of inconsistent congressional action."5
The Supreme Court's decision that certain conduct of the
state was rendered immune from antitrust scrutiny was based
on principles of federalism." The Court stated that "in a dual
system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitution-
ally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to
nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not
lightly to be attributed to Congress."5 " Parker stands for the
principle that unless the state itself has expressly directed or
authorized an anti-competitive practice, the state's subdivi-
sions, in exercising their delegated power, must obey the anti-
trust laws.53
Subsequent rulings have narrowed the scope and use of the
Parker state-action exemption as a defense to antitrust chal-
46. See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
599-640 (2d ed. 1984). Areas which have been exempt from antitrust attack include
organized labor, specific sectors of the insurance and banking industries, and agricul-
tural cooperatives. Id.
47. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 50-55.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 344-50.
50. Id. at 367.
51. Id. at 351. "The principles of federalism leave in the states a power to regulate
in the interest of safety, health and well-being of local communities .... Id. at 362.
52. Id. at 351.
53. Id. at 352.
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lenges. 4 However, it was not until 1978 in City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co. 55 that the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of immunity from antitrust attack for munic-
ipal defendants acting as agents "of the state with broadly
delegated responsibilities and a distinct governmental
character. 5
6
2. Municipal Immunity: The Lafayette and
Boulder Decisions
In Lafayette,5 7 the availability of the Parker state-action
exemption for municipalities was addressed.5 8 Lafayette in-
volved a allegation by a public utility that two municipality-
owned power companies violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act by attempting to delay construction of the public utility's
nuclear power plant.5 9 The city of Lafayette raised the Parker
state-action immunity as a defense.6
In a plurality opinion, the Court addressed the implica-
tions of granting municipalities a general exemption from an-
titrust liability.61 Conceding that municipalities are more
concerned with the public welfare of the community than of
private parties, the opinion stated that "municipalities were no
more likely than private interests to protect national economic
goals."' 62 The Court stated that the benefits of municipal ac-
tivity did not outweigh the risk that municipalities will "place
54. The lead cases refining the scope of the Parker immunity are: Bates v. State of
Ariz. 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 588-603
(1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-92 (1975). "Each case in-
volved a private party or quasi-public body which claimed to be exempt from antitrust
liability under the state action doctrine." Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to
Municipal Activities, 79 COLUM. L. Rnv. 519, 520 (1979). The trilogy reflected the
Supreme Court's disfavor of antitrust exemptions. Id. at 521. However, these cases did
not present a wholly public body claiming exemption from antitrust immunity. Id. at
521.
55. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
56. Note, supra note 54, at 521.
57. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
58. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 49 (1982).
59. 435 U.S. at 392.
60. Id. at 394. After Lafayette, the Parker state-action defense for municipal de-
fendants was severely restricted. For an authoritative discussion of the Lafayette deci-
sion, see Comment, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action"After Lafayette, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 435 (1981).
61. 435 U.S. at 403-04.
62. Id. at 403.
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their own parochial interests above the economic goals, ' 6 3 and
refused to grant municipalities the same deference afforded to
the states in Parker based on their municipality status alone. 64
However, the Court held that "municipalities would qualify
for antitrust immunity if the municipal activity was pursuant
to state policy to displace competition with regulation. ' 65 La-
fayette placed strict limitations on antitrust immunity granted
to municipalities.66
The 1982 decision of Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder 67 affirmed the Lafayette principle that anti-
trust immunity for municipalities should be cautiously found.
In Boulder, the city had passed an emergency ordinance
prohibiting Community Communications Company, Inc., the
assignee of a permit to conduct cable television within the lim-
its of the city, from expanding its cable television business. At
the same time, the city invited competitors to enter the Boul-
der cable television market.68 Community Communications
Company, Inc., brought suit alleging that the restriction vio-
lated section 1 of the Sherman Act.6 9
The city defended the action by asserting that the Parker
state-action doctrine was applicable. 70  The city argued that
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment 7' for municipalities had
"vested in the city of Boulder 'every power theretofore pos-
63. Id. at 412-13.
64. Id. at 411-13. For an in-depth commentary on the potential damage due to
municipal exemptions from antitrust law, see generally Note, Antitrust Law and Munic-
ipal Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt from Sherman Act Coverage under the
Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547 (1977).
65. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413.
66. Note, supra note 54, at 522.
67. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
68. Id. at 46. The emergency ordinance was for a period of three months and the
Boulder City Council announced it was necessary to prevent Community Communica-
tion Co.'s expansion from discouraging potential competitors from entering the market.
Id.
69. Id. at 47.
70. Id. at 48. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
distinguished Boulder from Lafayette, and held that the city's actions satisfied the crite-
ria for the Parker exemption. Id.
71. COLO. CONST. art. XX § 6. Although the Colorado "home rule" statute
granted extensive powers to municipalities and may have given the City of Boulder the
authority to regulate the cable television industry, the statute did not sufficiently articu-
late a state policy to confer immunity from the antitrust laws. ABA ANTITRUST SEC-
TION, supra note 46, at 610.
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sessed by the legislature... in local and municipal affairs,' "72
and that this broad grant of authority was sufficient to satisfy
the state-action criterion of Parker.73
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, and
in doing so continued the trend of limiting immunities from
antitrust attack for municipalities put forth in Lafayette.74
Boulder held that broad grants of authority to enact municipal
ordinances are not sufficient to satisfy the Parker exemption. 7
III. THE FISHER OPINIONS
A. The Marshall Majority
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Fisher v. City
of Berkeley, 6 disregarded the Parker doctrine and utilized an
alternative antitrust analysis to resolve the issue presented to
the Supreme Court.7 7 Although Justice Marshall acknowl-
edged that the ordinance would affect the city's residential
housing market in much the same way as a landlord cartel
established to control prices,78 the opinion distinguished the
ordinance's regulatory scheme from a cartel based on the fact
that the rental ceiling had been unilaterally imposed.79 The
distinction between a concerted and unilateral action became
crucial to the majority's opinion. The Court noted that unless
a concerted action is present, there can be no municipal liabil-
ity under section 1 of the Sherman Act, even if the restraint
itself unreasonably affects trade.80
The Marshall opinion was careful to indicate that "[n]ot
all municipal restraints imposed upon private actors ... con-
stitute unilateral action outside the purview of section L."'81
When private actors are granted a degree of private regulatory
72. 455 U.S. at 52.
73. Id. at 51.
74. Id. at 56.
75. Id.
76. 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
77. Id. at 1048.
78. Id. at 1049. A cartel is a small number of competitors who act in concert to
decrease quantity and maximize profits. R. POSNER, ANTrrRUST CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 5 (1974).
79. 106 S. Ct. at 1049.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1050.
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power in the restraint, it will be characterized as hybrid and
subject to antitrust attack. 2 The Court found the purely reg-
ulatory scheme imposed by the ordinance to be free of any
private interest and therefore solely unilateral in nature.
8 3
Since the ordinance lacked a concerted action as required by
section 1, the Court concluded it was not "facially inconsis-
tent" with the Sherman Act. 4 The judgment of the California
Supreme Court was affirmed.85
B. The Powell Concurring Opinion
Justice Powell concurred with the judgment, 6 but criti-
cized the Court for its failure to utilize the straightforward
analytical framework established in Parker v. Brown."7 Main-
taining that the Parker88 state-action exemption 89 was appli-
cable to the facts put forth in Fisher, Justice Powell viewed the
issue presented to the Court as whether California's legisla-
ture had expressly delegated to the city of Berkeley an ade-
quate mandate to displace competition in the rental housing
market.90 Finding that the California legislature had directly
authorized the displacement of competition in the housing
market, Justice Powell concluded that the mandate satisfied
the Parker requirements for exemption and concurred with
the majority's finding of immunity. 9'
C. The Brennan Dissent
Justice Brennan, the sole dissenter, criticized the Court's
disregard of "over 40 years of carefully considered prece-
dent."92 He determined that municipalities should not be
found immune from antitrust attack and criticized the major-
ity's conclusion that the ordinance lacked a concert of action
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1051.
84. Id. Had the ordinance been a concerted action it would have been both in
conflict with and preempted by federal antitrust laws. See supra note 9.
85. 106 S. Ct. at 1051.
86. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
89. See supra text accompanying note 52.
90. 106 S. Ct. at 1051-53.
91. Id. at 1053.
92. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sufficient to satisfy section 1.93 Justice Brennan cited as con-
trolling precedent Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp.,9 which held that a statutory scheme authorizing liquor
distributors to enforce agreements fixing minimum prices on
their products against retailers who had not agreed to price
restrictions was a concerted action sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirement of section 1.95 Quoting Schwegmann, Justice Bren-
nan pointed out that "[w]hen [landlords] are forced to
abandon price competition, they are driven into a compact in
violation of the spirit of the proviso [Sherman Act] which for-
bids 'horizontal' price fixing." '96
The Brennan dissent continued by criticizing the major-
ity's proposition that the "ordinary relationship between the
government and those who must obey its regulatory com-
mands whether they wish to or not is not enough to establish a
conspiracy, ' 97 stating that no previous decision had "held, or
indeed even suggested, that government-imposed restraints on
economic actions cannot constitute concerted action." 98
Brennan concluded with an inference that the majority's rule
infringed upon Congress' power to expressly grant immunity
from the antitrust laws. 99
IV. ANALYSIS
The Fisher 100 decision creates a new approach to the reso-
lution of municipal social-welfare problems. The decision al-
lows local social-welfare problems to be resolved by
regulatory methods traditionally outlawed by the Sherman
Act.
Irrespective of the intent behind the decision, the majority
failed to recognize and incorporate established antitrust prin-
93. Id. at 1055.
94. 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Justice Brennan's dissent also noted that California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 455 U.S. 97 (1980) was applicable.
106 S. Ct. at 1054 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1054-55.
96. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 389).
97. 106 S. Ct. at 1055.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1057. Congress' power is to create explicit statutory exemptions from the
antitrust laws. Other exemptions have been implied by the courts. See ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION, supra note 46, at 599.
100. 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
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ciples, consider the long-run economic implications of the rule
in Berkeley and throughout the United States, or to recognize
Congress' unique position to expressly grant immunity from
antitrust scrutiny in its decision. These omissions in the
Fisher decision led to the creation of a new antitrust immunity
which will have a broad and detrimental impact on the coun-
try's municipalities.
A. The Erosion of The Sherman Act
1. The Coercive Government Activity Standard
In its creation of a new antitrust immunity for municipal
ordinances, the majority in Fisher fails to incorporate properly
the Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp. '01 standard
for coercive governmental restraints of trade. Schwegmann
held that governmental actions which had a coercive effect
upon private parties, who must obey the governmental action,
were concerted actions sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 10 2 The majority distinguished
Schwegmann 103 and proceeded to create a new standard for
coercive municipal activities which restrain trade. 104 The new
standard created by the Marshall majority requires the munic-
ipal activity must first be classified as hybrid in order to be a
concerted action sufficient to violate section 1.105
In theory, the standard may be reasonable, but when ap-
plied to the diverse activities of the nation's 62,437 municipal-
ities, 10 6 it becomes ambiguous and unmanageable. It is the
Court's failure to define the extent of private participation
necessary to characterize an activity as hybrid which creates
the ambiguity.
101. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
102. Id. at 389.
103. The majority in Fisher distinguished Schwegmann by asserting that the regula-
tory scheme in Schwegmann left both the selection of price levels and exclusive power to
enforce those levels to private parties, while in Fisher the only private party interest was
"some power to trigger enforcement." 106 S. Ct. at 1050-51.
104. Id. at 1049-51.
105. Id.
106. 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, GOVERN-
MENTAL ORGANIZATION 1 (1983). Municipalities throughout the nation administer
and regulate a broad range of activities including airports, schools, highways, utilities,
libraries, recreation, and sanitation, in addition to public housing. See C. RHYNE, MU-
NICIPAL LAW § 4-6, at 68-69; § 21-1, at 465; § 25-1, at 516 (1957).
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Municipal ordinances are often the result of private party
lobbying efforts. Therefore, even though it may seem that a
popularly enacted ordinance has no such interest in it, in real-
ity there may be a high degree of such interest promoting the
ordinance. The lack of a clear and legitimate standard to
classify a municipal activity as unilateral or hybrid will lead to
a broad application of the newly found immunity in all munic-
ipal markets.
2. Precedential Limitations on Municipal Immunity
The Fisher majority opinion disregarded the trend put
forth in both City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co. 107 and Community Communications Co. v. City of Boul-
der10 8 which limits municipal immunity from the antitrust
laws. The result was that the majority created exactly the
type of immunity which the Lafayette majority feared; one
which "leave[s] this fundamental national policy [of competi-
tion] open to the vagaries of the political process. ' 09 The
Fisher decision presents municipalities with the freedom to
make economic choices counseled solely by their own paro-
chial interests and without regard to their anti-competitive ef-
fects. The result is that "a serious chink in the armor of
antitrust protection [is] introduced"110 which directly conflicts
with free market competition.
Had the strong policy preference disfavoring antitrust ex-
emptions been carefully considered by the Marshall majority,
Fisher would have been decided in a manner more consistent
with antitrust precedent. An erosion of national economic
objectives, codified in the Sherman Act, would not have been
authorized by the United States Supreme Court had precedent
been considered carefully.
107. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See supra text accompanying note 67.
108. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). Broad grants of authority to municipalities to regulate
economic activities within their boundaries are not sufficient to qualify a municipality
for antitrust immunity. Id. at 54-56.
109. 435 U.S. at 406.
110. Id. at 408.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
B. Economic Impact
The decision of Fisher v. City of Berkeley will have an ad-
verse economic impact not only in Berkeley, but also in mu-
nicipalities throughout the country.
1. The Berkeley Housing Market
Although rent control has the short-run, meritorious effect
of stablilizing housing markets,111 over time the impact be-
comes detrimental to the community enforcing it. Because
rent control displaces competition,1 1 2 the economic incentive
justifying investment in the community is reduced as the like-
lihood that investors will maximize profit becomes uncer-
tain. '1 3 A long-term shortage of rental units results. 1 4 The
current housing stock deteriorates because of the lack of in-
vestment incentives. 1 5 Poor quality housing then leads to a
displacement of residents of the community.1 1 6  Unfortu-
nately, in failing to consider the long-term impact of the ordi-
nance on the community, a decision was made which will lead
the city of Berkeley into the exact situation that the ordinance
was trying to instantaneously rectify.
2. The Markets of Municipalities Throughout the Country
The ultimate ruling of the Court, that a municipality's au-
thority to protect public welfare should not be constrained by
the Sherman Act, will greatly influence municipal economies
throughout the country.1 7 This new immunity places no lim-
itations upon the market sectors in which municipal ordi-
nances can affect competition. Therefore, the potential for
111. M. LETT, RENT CONTROL 42 (1976).
112. Id. at 44.
113. Id. Investors may turn to communities without such controls or abandon the
rental market entirely and focus on the construction of fee-simple, owner-occupied
housing. Id.
114. Id. at 45.
115. Id. "The redistribution operates not only between landlords and tenants of
rent controlled housing but also between owners of controlled and exempt buildings and
between protected tenants and other housing consumers." Id. at 47.
116. Id. at 47. Further, rent control can lead to "severe inequities" because hous-
ing subject to rent control will fill up with early "claimants." This leaves later claimants
to "compete for whatever, if any, controlled units become available or pay the higher
controlled market price." Id.
117. 435 U.S. at 412.
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serious market distortion in all municipal economies is great.
No longer will the beneficial, stabilizing effect of market
forces" 8 be protected in municipal economies, since the hold-
ing in Fisher allows municipalities to engage in conduct which
"eliminates price competition more effectively than any pri-
vate 'agreement' ever could."' 1 9
C. Congressional Authority to Grant Antitrust Immunity
The final flaw of the Fisher decision is the obvious usurpa-
tion of power by the judiciary in its authorization of antitrust
immunity for municipal ordinances. As Justice Brennan as-
serts, it is Congress that "may choose to amend the antitrust
laws to grant municipalities broad discretion to enact an-
ticompetitive measures in the public interest."' 20 Given the
tradition ofjudicial restraint limiting antitrust immunities, the
Supreme Court should have given deference to the one branch
of government empowered to enact expressed immunity from
the Sherman Act.
V. CONCLUSION
Fisher v. City of Berkeley' 2 ' presented the United States
Supreme Court with a difficult conflict between two compet-
ing policies: maintaining competition as the fundamental eco-
nomic principle in the United States versus municipal rights
to implement social-welfare programs. The Supreme Court
chose the latter, and in doing so has opened a potentially vast
area of antitrust immunity for municipalities. Unfortunately,
this new area of immunity from antitrust attack represents an
erosion of the Sherman Act and subjects national economic
policy to the vagaries inherent in local political processes.' 22
BARBARA J. FINIGAN
118. Competitive forces promote efficiency and progress as they stabilize supply
and demand naturally in a market economy. See P. AREEDA, supra note 12, at 8-10.
119. 106 S. Ct. at 1056 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1057.
121. 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
122. The Court expressly noted that such vagaries were not the intent of Congress.
See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 406.

